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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to examine effects of managerial and family ownership structure on the company performance. 
The sample consists of four hundred and twenty companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the year from 2003 to 2007. 
The study shows that equity ownerships in Malaysia are concentrated on few owners mainly by the State government, 
families or large corporations. Results reveal that managerial ownership relates significantly to return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE) while family ownership relates significantly to Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. Results suggest that 
an increase in the proportion of insider ownerships enhances the company performance due to re-alignment of internal 
and external interests and reduction in conflict of interests among shareholders. The results further indicate that the 
firm performance decreases when the managers’ share ownership increases. Managers with greater control and large 
shareholdings are more concerned with their own self-interests than the interests of the shareholders at large. 
Keywords: Managerial; family; ownership; performance; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Ownership structure is one of the important factors in 
shaping the corporate governance system of a firm. The 
concentration of ownership is beneficial to corporations 
because large shareholdings would allow for greater 
monitoring of managers (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The 
absence of separation between ownership and control 
reduces the conflicts of interest between owners and 
managers which would in turn increase the shareholders’ 
value (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988). 
 Controlling shareholders is common in East Asian 
corporations. Firms are usually controlled by families or 
the State government who have power primarily through 
the use of pyramids and participation in management (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999). A study by 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) in nine East Asian 
countries including Malaysia reports that more than two 
thirds of the firms are controlled by single shareholders. 
About 60% of concentrated firms’ top management relate 
to the family of the controlling shareholder. The extensive 
family control is more than half of East Asian firms. 
 In Malaysia, share of most Malaysian companies 
are commonly concentrated by the ownerships of the 
State, families or individuals. On the average, 73% of the 
shareholdings are owned by the top twenty shareholders 
(Abdullah & Mohd-Nasir 2004). A study shows that, on 
average, the largest shareholder holds 36% of the firm’s 
shares (Abdullah 2001). In 1997, the ownership structure 
held by the nominee companies was 45.6% of the total 
shares held by the top five shareholders. However, 
the ownership pattern has changed over time and the 
majority of shareholdings by the nominee companies and 
institutions were owned by families (Zhuang, Edwards & 
Capulong 2001). 
Hui (1981) found that, from 1974 to 1976, 69% of total 
shares in 62 largest Malaysian firms is owned by only 0.8% 
of the total number of shareholders. In 1993, three largest 
owners in the ten Malaysian largest non-financial domestic 
listed companies was 54%. The ownership by the (La Porta, 
Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1998). A survey 
conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (1998) shows that 
almost 97% of Malaysian Public Listed Companies (PLCs) 
are substantial shareholders with 33% of them involved 
in management. A substantial shareholder is defined as 
having at least 5% (direct or indirectly) of the aggregate 
of nominal amounts of all the voting shares in the firm, as 
defined in Section 69D, Companies Act 1965. 
 Therefore, this study examines the managerial 
ownership structure and family ownership structure with 
company performance. Managerial ownership refers 
to where the managers (the executive directors) are the 
shareholders of the company (Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Mat Nor, Said & Redzuan 1999; Mohd Sehat & Abdul 
Rahman 2005; Mat Nor & Sulong 2007; Mohd Ali et al. 
2008). Family ownership is defined as family members 
who own company shares, and, act as the executive 
directors in the company (Ng 2005; Andres 2008; Chu 
2009; Lin & Chang 2010). 
 This study predicts that there are differences in 
company performance because for managers that work 
for companies, they will strive hard and make sure those 
companies are making profit. Thus, these managers will 
expect to receive bonuses and shares from the companies 
as a return for the hard work done. However, for the 
family directors, they have two choices – to strive hard, 
to ensure that family companies are making great profit, 
and later, they are the ones that receive the returns in terms 
of bonuses or shares, or just feel comfortable with the 
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current situation within which they are operating and only 
endeavour to sustain their businesses. Therefore, this study 
expects some differences in ownership between managerial 
ownership and family ownership. It is expected that the 
findings from this study could enhance the literatures 
relating to ownership structure in the Malaysian context, 
and provide meaningful information to investors at large 
on the structure of ownership in Malaysia, thereby enabling 
better comparison with other Asian countries. 
 The presentation format of this study is as follows. 
First, the introduction section highlights the problem 
statement and motivation of the study. Then, discussions 
pertaining to the ownership structure and firm performance 
will be deliberated in the literature review section. The 
research methodology is then explained. Then the research 
findings and discussion are presented. Finally, the research 
findings are summarized followed by the limitations of the 
study, and recommendations for future study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The ownership structure is an important factor in shaping 
the corporate governance system. The degree of ownership 
concentration in a company is determined based on 
the distribution of power between its managers and 
shareholders. The concentration of ownership is beneficial 
to companies as large shareholdings allow for greater 
monitoring of managers (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Thus, 
the absence of separation between ownership and control 
reduces conflicts of interest and increases the shareholders’ 
value (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988). 
 The ownership structure is also a primary determinant 
of the agency problems between controlling insiders and 
outside investors, which has important implications for 
the valuation of the firm (Lemmons & Lins 2003). The 
controlling insiders can potentially disadvantage outside 
investors by diverting resources for their personal use or 
by committing funds to unprofitable projects that provide 
private benefit but reduce the firm’s value. Alternatively, 
by investing resources in good projects, the firm’s value 
increases and the insiders can increase their wealth in 
proportion to their claims on the firm. The next section of 
this paper discusses the literature relating to managerial 
ownership and family ownership.
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP
Past researchers (Morck et al. 1988; McConnell & 
Servaes 1990) found a nonlinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and the performance of US firms. 
Managerial ownership is a way to curb agency problems 
by encouraging manager-owners to look to entrepreneurial 
gain, which gives them an incentive to increase the value 
of the organization rather than to shirk (Jensen & Mecking 
1976). Research has found that there is a linear relation 
between firm performance and managerial ownership 
structure (Demsetz & Lehn 1985). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest the alignment-of-interest hypothesis. Due 
to a reduction of agency costs, this hypothesis predicts 
that firm value and operating performance increases as 
management ownership rises. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
explain that when managerial ownership increases, there 
is a greater alignment of interests of managers and outside 
shareholders. Managerial ownership and firm performance 
is observed to have a positive relationship when ownership 
is below 5% (Holderness, Kroszner & Sheehan 1999).
 However, at certain levels of equity ownership, 
managers’ consumption of perquisites may outweigh the 
loss they suffer from a reduced value of the firm. Therefore, 
the entrenchment hypothesis predicts a negative relation 
between operating performance and managerial ownership 
(Fama & Jensen 1983). A high level of managerial 
ownership in a high information asymmetry environment 
allows managers to indulge preferences for non-value-
maximizing behaviour. Studies evidence that at high levels 
of managerial ownership, managers become entrenched 
in their positions resulting in a negative relation between 
managerial ownership and firm valuation (Stulz 1988). 
 Mat Nor and Sulong (2007) argue that when managers 
own a smaller portion of the organisation’s share, they 
have greater incentive to pursue personal benefits and 
less incentive to maximise organisation value. Thus, to 
reduce the agency costs is to increase the shares held by 
the managers. Owner-managers become more efficient in 
controlling the corporate assets than hired managers.
 More recent research accounts for both the alignment 
and entrenchment hypotheses by considering a nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. Experts found that when Tobin’s Q was used 
as a proxy of firm value, ‘the alignment of interest’ occurs at 
low levels of managerial ownership but that ‘entrenchment’ 
takes place at high levels of ownership (Morck et al. 1988; 
McConnell & Servaes 1990). Morck et al. (1988) found 
that the alignment hypothesis effects are dominant within 
the 0 to 5% range and above the 25% level, and that the 
entrenchment effect is dominant within the 5 to 25% 
ownership range. McConnell and Servaes (1990) propose 
a quadratic model in which the coefficient on managerial 
ownership is expected to be positive, while the coefficient 
on managerial ownership is expected to be negative. 
However, they do not support the entrenchment findings 
by Morck et al. (1988) at the intermediate ownership level. 
 Subsequently, Short and Keasey (1999) argue that 
a cubic model better describes the transition between 
alignment affects to entrenchment affects and back to 
alignment. The coefficients on ownership and ownership 
cubic are expected to be positive, while the coefficient 
on ownership-squared is expected to be negative. Their 
evidence supports the cubic model of ownership structure 
to describe firm performance. The findings are consistent 
with Morck et al. (1988). The entrenchment effect takes 
place when managerial ownership is between 16% and 
42%, which is slightly different from the 5% to 25% 
of Morck et al. (1988). Stulz (1988) demonstrates that 
at sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, 
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managers become entrenched in their positions resulting 
in a negative relation between managerial ownership 
and firm value. Rose (2005) argues that managers who 
control a substantial part of the firm’s equity may be able 
to have sufficient influence to secure the most favourable 
employment conditions, including an attractive salary. A 
study in the United States (US) found that, on average, 
managerial ownership is significantly negative every year 
(1988 to 2003) for American firms. In this study, firm value 
was measured using Tobin’s Q. Managers are more likely 
to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms 
are performing well, and more likely to increase their 
ownership when their firms become financially constrained 
(Fahlenbrach & Stulz 2010).
 Local studies have found that when the directors’ 
ownership is at a range of 5% to 25%, the financial 
performance is significant. However, at other ranges, there 
is no relationship between ownership and performance (Mat 
Nor, Said & Redzuan 1999). Yarram and Balachandran 
(2005) conducted a study for non-financial companies 
in 2004. They found that Tobin’s Q has no significant 
influence on managerial ownership. Perhaps, political 
connections may have a pervasive influence on corporate 
decisions in Malaysia (Johnson & Mitton 2003). Ali 
Ahmed (2009) points out that there is a positive association 
between managerial ownership and Malaysian firm 
performance. It is further supported by Mahmud, Muhd 
Kamil & Pok (2010) that managerial ownership has a 
significantly positive association with firm performance 
measured using Tobin’s Q and ROA, which is consistent 
with the alignment-of-interest hypothesis. On average, 
26% of shares issued by Malaysian firms are held, directly 
or indirectly by directors.
 Thus, based on the arguments in the empirical studies, 
this study predicts that the managerial ownership has a non-
linear relationship (alignment-entrenchment-alignment) 
with firm performance. At a low level of ownership, when 
managers are rewarded with shares, they feel happy and 
are motivated to work for the company. As the level of 
ownership increases, managers start to manipulate or 
control the company by potentially expropriating the 
interests of the minority shareholders for their personal 
interests. Next, when the shareholdings increase beyond, 
firm value starts to enhance again. At this stage, managers 
with high shareholdings may become the substantial or 
controlling shareholder of the company. Therefore, these 
managers want to ensure that the firm gains profits and it 
is aligned with the interest of the managers. Therefore, it 
is hypothesised that:
H1a Ceteris paribus, there is a non-linear relationship 
(alignment-entrenchment-alignment) between 
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q.
H1b Ceteris paribus, there is a non-linear relationship 
(alignment-entrenchment-alignment) between 
managerial ownership and Return on Assets (ROA).
H1c Ceteris paribus, there is a non-linear relationship 
(alignment-entrenchment-alignment) between 
managerial ownership and Return on Equity (ROE).
FAMILY OWNERSHIP
Family ownership is prevalent in most countries around the 
world. In the US, families present one-third of the S&P 500 
and account for 18% of outstanding equity. It is found that 
there is a nonlinear relationship between family holdings 
and firm performance (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb 2003). 
Most of the firms are family companies whereby the legal 
control of voting stock is held by one or a few families who 
are either related in some way or share a certain degree 
of affinity or alliance (Corbetta 1995). Faccio and Lang 
(2002) note that firms in the UK and Ireland are 44.29% 
controlled by families. A research conducted by Franks and 
Mayers (2001) reports that family shareholdings account 
for one-third of total shareholdings in Germany.
 Families also have a strong incentive to decrease 
agency costs and increase the firm value. Concentrated 
shareholders have a strong economic incentive to monitor 
managers and decrease agency costs (Demsetz & Lehn 
1985). Since families usually invest most of their private 
wealth in the company and it is not well-diversified, 
families are more concerned with the firm’s survival 
and have a strong incentive to monitor management 
closely. Monitoring costs tend to be lower in companies 
controlled by family than by non-family (Fleming, Heaney 
& Rochelle 2005; Fama & Jensen 1983). Anderson et al. 
(2003) show that family firms enjoy a lower cost of debt 
financing compared to non-family firms. This is because 
families have a committed, undiversified stake in the 
company and induce a strong incentive to monitor, as the 
company survival and its value maximisation is important 
to them. The unique interests associated with the long-
term family commitment explain that family ownership 
is an organizational structure that decreases the conflict 
between shareholders and themselves, thus, protecting 
their interests. Family ownership is only related to superior 
firm performance under certain conditions. If families are 
just large shareholders without board representation, the 
performance of their companies is not distinguishable 
from other firms. In addition, the results indicate that other 
block-holders either affect firm performance adversely or 
have no detectable influence on performance measures 
(Andres 2008).
 However, it cannot be denied that family companies 
with a concentrated ownership do face agency problems 
between the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders and the threat of expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ rights may become a reality. Family 
companies can make sub-optimal investment decisions 
since the interests of the family are not necessarily in 
line with those of other shareholders (Fama & Jensen 
1985). Moreover, restricted ownership reduces external 
governance and highlights the problems of self-control 
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that arise when a firm is headed by a powerful owner/
manager or because family relationships tend to make 
agency problems more difficult to resolve (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino & Bucholtz 2001). There is a possibility 
that family firms might use their concentrated ownership 
to expropriate wealth from other shareholders (Morck, 
Strangeland & Yeung 2000). Morck et al. (2000) argue 
that family ownership in Canada leads to poor financial 
performance. The entrepreneurial spirit and expertise 
are partly inherited and descendants gradually regress 
towards average talent and it affects firm performance 
negatively. The family’s role in selecting managers and 
members of the supervisory board also increase the 
entrenchment and may lower firm value since external 
parties can hardly capture control over the firm. The 
findings reveal that family control by heirs leads to 
slower growth because of inefficiencies that are due 
to entrenchment, high barriers against outside control 
and low investment in innovation. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) argue that the performance of family firms gets 
worse as firm age increases. The families, as large and 
undiversified investors, might pursue risk reduction 
strategies, thus, it indirectly affects firm performance. 
 La Porta et al. (1999) discovered that firms in Hong 
Kong are largely family controlled, and that there are few 
widely-held firms. Since most firms are family-owned and 
controlled, the family ownership in Hong Kong affects 
performance. At a very high level of ownership, the 
entrenchment effect becomes dominant. This indicates 
that if the family ownership can be controlled and made 
use of appropriately, firm performance can be optimized. 
A firm with high ownership concentration should pay 
more attention to improving corporate governance 
practices in order to enhance firm performance (Ng 2005). 
In contrast, later studies show that there is no positive 
relationship between family ownership in Hong Kong 
and firm performance using ROA, ROE or the market-
to-book ratio (Chen, Stouraitis & Wong 2005). A study 
in India by Johl, Jackling and Joshi (2010) evidenced 
that low family ownership leads to better performance, 
whilst high ownership is related to lower performance. 
This implies that the relation between family ownership 
and firm performance is not uniform across all levels of 
family ownership. As families have large control of the 
firm, the potential for entrenchment and poor performance 
is high.
 Meanwhile, most firms in Thailand are family-owned 
and their businesses are financed by the family-owned 
money. Individual or institutional investors typically 
hold small shares in the firms (Jelatianranat 2000). 
Family-controlled firms have shown a significantly higher 
performance. The presence of controlling shareholders is 
associated with higher firm performance, when measured 
using ROA and the sales-asset ratio (Wiwattanakang 2001). 
In Taiwan, there is a nonlinear relationship between 
family ownership and performance. The findings reveal 
that when family ownership is weak, the performance of 
family-control is low. A family only needs 15% equity 
on a listed firm to control the firms effectively. Thus, an 
effective way of mitigating the ownership problem is 
when the family ownership is high but with low family 
representation on the board. In this way, the conflict of 
interest between the majority and minority shareholders 
can be minimized (Yeh, Lee & Woidtke 2001). Family 
ownership is positively associated with the performance 
(measured using ROA). Chu (2009) reveals a strong 
positive association, particularly when family members 
serve as CEOs, top managers, chairpersons, or directors of 
the firms; however, the association becomes weak when 
family members are not involved in firm management or 
control. Lin and Chang (2010) found that an optimal level 
of family ownership was between 31.76% and 33.61%, 
and, at this level, firm value is maximized.
 In Malaysia, empirical studies also discuss the 
ownership and firm performance. Studies claim that listed 
firms in Malaysia are owned or controlled by family and 
that these companies appear to be inherited by their own 
descendants (Abdul Rahman 2006). It is reported that 
nearly 67.2% of the Malaysian companies are owned by 
families (Claessens et al. 2000). The World Bank study 
in 1999 (Backman & Butler 2003) on PLCs in Malaysia 
and other Asian countries, found that single shareholders 
control more than half of PLCs shares, and that families 
control at least 60% of PLCs shares. Specifically, 67.2% 
shares are owned by family firms, 37.4% are in the hands 
of only one dominant shareholder and 13.4% are state 
controlled. Thus, family controlled dominate and control 
the majority of the Malaysian capital market. 
 According to a survey done in 1996, family firms in 
Malaysia control almost 60% of PLCs (Soederberg 2003) 
and the majority of Malaysian firms have an ultimate 
controlling owner, particularly an individual or family 
(Ishak 2004). A study by Mohd Sehat and Abdul Rahman 
(2005) examined the ownership concentration from the 
perspective of direct shareholdings with a cut-off level 
for ownership of 5%. The results show that the average 
shares held by block-holders in the top 100 Malaysian 
listed companies was 55.84%. Thus, it can be concluded 
that ownership and control are highly concentrated 
in Malaysia. The concentrated ownership structure in 
Malaysia may be influenced by the families’ business 
style, culture, race and regulations imposed in Malaysia. 
For example, Bursa Malaysia only requires Malaysian 
PLCs to issue a small portion of shares to the public. KLSE 
Listing Requirements paragraph 2.08 and 8.15, Required 
Public Listing Spread, require that listed companies must 
ensure that at least 25% of their total shares are in the 
hand of a minimum 1,000 public shareholders holding 
not less than 100 shares each. All companies need to issue 
at least 25% of the shares to the public, including family 
businesses. Meanwhile the remaining shares can still be 
owned by family firms. Therefore, it is still possible that 
the remaining 75% of the company shares are held by 
family members. Families can remain as the controlling 
shareholders, as long as they own the shares and control 
the company.
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 Therefore, based on the discussed literature, this study 
predicts that ownership by family members does motivate 
family directors to enhance company performance. Family 
members who own only a small amount of share equity 
would be less attached to the company. However, as the 
family ownership increases, family managers exert more 
effort and work for the firm, as if the company is part of 
them. Furthermore, the majority of the family wealth is 
invested in the family companies. Thus, family directors 
will struggle to gain higher profits because it is their own 
wealth too. Family-companies can also make sub-optimal 
investment decisions since the interests of the family are 
not necessarily consistent with those of other shareholders. 
Restricted ownership also reduces external governance, 
and there is a possibility that family firms might use their 
concentrated ownership to expropriate wealth from other 
shareholders. Therefore, this study hypothesises that:
H2a Ceteris paribus, there is a non-linear relationship 
(entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) between 
family ownership and Tobin’s Q.
H2b Ceteris paribus, there is a non-linear relationship 
(entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) between 
family ownership and Return on Assets (ROA).
H2c Ceteris paribus, there is a non-linear relationship 
(entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) between 
family ownership and Return on Equity (ROE).
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
SAMPLE SELECTION
The sampling frame for this study consists of 420 public 
listed companies on the Main Board and Second Board of 
Bursa Malaysia (excluding financial companies) over the 
period of 2003 to 2007 (5 years). The industry is regulated 
under the Banking and Financial Act (BAFIA), 1989. The 
BAFIA (1989) allows Financial Institutions (FIs) to make 
portfolio investments in non-financial businesses up to 
a maximum of 20% of the FIs shareholders’ funds and 
up to 10% of the issued share capital of a company in 
which the investment is made. The FIs are not allowed to 
assume any management role to take up a board position 
(Chu & Cheah 2004). Public Listed Companies (PLCs) 
are chosen because the published annual reports have 
been audited by the public auditors and the reliability of 
the data is assured. 
DATA GATHERING
The data for this study were hand-collected from 
secondary sources, mainly from the companies’ annual 
reports and Datastream (the Datastream database is 
available in Perpustakaan Sultanah Bahiyah, Universiti 
Utara Malaysia. Financial data were downloaded using 
the Datastream). In this study the dependent variables are 
Q, ROA and ROE. Accounting-based measures such as ROA 
and ROE are backward-looking measurements (Anderson 
& Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Mahmud et al. 
2010) that reflect accounting rules and show the current 
performance of the firm, while market-based indicators 
such as Tobin’s Q is a forward-looking measure that 
reflect the market’s valuation of the firm (Morck et al. 
1988; McConnell & Servaes 1990; Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Andres 2008; Fahlenbrach 
& Stulz 2010). Q is defined as the market value of 
ordinary shares plus the book value of preferred shares 
and debt divided by the book value of total assets, ROA is 
the net income divided by book value of total assets and 
ROE is the net income divided by shareholders’ equity. 
A family-controlled company is defined as: (i) founder 
is the CEO, or successor is the CEO that is related by 
blood or marriage (Yeh, Lee & Woidtke 2001; Anderson 
& Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Andres 2008), 
(ii) at least two family members in the management, 
and (iii) families have ownership (direct and indirect 
shareholdings) of a minimum of 20% in the company (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer 1999; Faccio & Lang 
2002; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Chu 2009). The directors 
and their respective shareholdings were identified from 
the annual report and also from the company prospectus 
available on the Bursa Malaysia website. Managerial 
ownership (MOWN) is measured as the proportion of 
shares (direct and indirect) shareholdings held by the 
executive directors over the total number of shares issued 
(Demsetz 1983; Fama & Jensen 1983; Demsetz & Lehn 
1985; Holderness et al. 1999; Mandaci & Gumus 2010; 
Fahlenbrach & Stulz 2010; and locally are Mat Nor et 
al. 1999; Mohd Sehat & Abdul Rahman 2005; Mat Nor 
& Sulong 2007; Mohd Ali et al. 2008; Ali Ahmed, 2009; 
Mahmud et al. 2010). Managerial ownership (MOWN, 
MOWN2, MOWN3) variable is use to test H1.
 Meanwhile family ownership (FOWN) is measured 
as the proportion of shares held by family directors over 
the total number of shares issued. This measurement has 
been used by previous researchers (Morck et al. 2000; 
Schulze et al. 2001; Yeh et al. 2001; Anderson et al. 2003; 
Ng 2005; Chen et al. 2005; Andres 2008; Achmad et al. 
2009; Chu, 2009; Lin & Chang 2010). Family ownership 
(FOWN, FOWN2, FOWN3) variable is use to test H2.
 The control variables for this study are debt, firm age, 
firm size and industry type. In this study debt (DEBT) is 
measured as the book value of long-term debt divided by 
total assets. Firm age (FAGE) is measured as the number 
of years since the company was incorporated. Firm size 
(FSIZE) was calculated by dividing the natural log of the 
book value with total assets. In this study, industries are 
trading services (TS), consumer products (CP), industrial 
products (IP), properties (PROP), plantation, construction, 
infrastructure projects, technology, hotels, and mining. 
This was then split into five groups TS, CP, IP, PROP and 
OTHERS. Plantation, construction, infrastructure projects, 
technology, hotels, and mining are grouped as OTHERS 
because these industries are small in number.
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RESEARCH MODEL AND MEASUREMENT
The research model of this study is as follows:
PERFit =  b0 + b1MOWNit + b2MOWN2it + b3MOWN3it + 
b4FOWNit + b5FOWN2it + b6FOWN3it + b7DEBTit 
+ b8FAGEit + b9FSIZEit + b10CPit+ b11IPit + b12TSit 
+ b13PROPit + b14OTHERS + εit 
Where;
PERF  =  Company performance (measured using Q, 
ROA and RO one at a time).
MOWN  =  % of executive directors ownership/total 
shares.
FOWN  =  % of family directors ownership/total shares.
DEBT  =  Book value of long-term debt/ total assets.
FAGE  =  Number of years since incorporated.
FSIZE  =  Natural log of the book value of total assets.
CP =  Consumer product
IP =  Industrial product
TS =  Trading services
PROP = Properties
OTHERS =  Plantations,  infrastructure projects , 
technologies, hotels. 
eit  =  Error term
MODEL SPECIFICATION
In this paper, managerial ownership (H1) and family 
ownership (H2) were measured continuously. The control 
variables in this study were debt, firm age, firm size and 
industries. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The results in Table 1 show that family-controlled 
companies on the main board comprise 666 (72.8%), and 
second board companies total up to 249 (27.2%). Nearly 
73% of family companies are derived from the Main Board. 
Thus, these findings are consistent with Ibrahim and Abdul 
Samad (2010) that the development of family business in 
Malaysia has contributed in producing a number of tycoons 
in their respective field. In return, these millionaires have 
contributed towards the Malaysian economy.
 Table 2 summarises the industries in which family-
controlled companies are highly involved. The industrial 
product (32.9%), consumer product (20.3%) and properties 
(13.7%) ranked as the top three industries that family 
businesses ventured into. While trading service (11.7%) 
and construction (10.4%) are in the fourth and fifth place 
for family-controlled firms. This indicates that family 
companies are involved in big businesses that need a huge 
amount of capital, with a large market segment and that 
these industries are highly demanded by the consumers. 
 Table 3 shows the difference in mean for managerial 
and family ownership is very small. The mean for 
managerial ownership is 44.63%, with a minimum level 
of ownership of 0% and maximum of 74.78%. This 
finding reveals a higher level of managerial ownership 
as compared to the study by Mahmud et al. (2010). For 
family ownership, the maximum value is 79.54% and the 
TABLE 1. Frequency and per cent of family-controlled 
companies by type of board
Family-controlled company
Frequency Per cent
Main board 666 72.8
Second board 249 27.2
Total 915 100.0
TABLE 2. Frequency and PER CENT of Family-Controlled Companies by Industry 
 Family-controlled Company
Frequency Per cent
Consumer Product
Industrial Product
Plantation
Trading Services
Construction
Infrastructure Projects
Technology
Hotels
Properties
Total
186
301
66
107
95
5
20
10
125
915
20.3
32.9
7.2
11.7
10.4
0.5
2.2
1.1
13.7
100.0
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mean for family ownership is 43.24%. This result is also 
slightly higher than the findings by Backman and Butler 
(2003). In sum, the findings from this study explain that 
managers do own substantial amounts of shares and that 
most of the managers are from family companies.
 Table 4 indicates that 35% of the managers own around 
26% to 50% of managerial shares and that 29% managers 
own at least 5% managerial ownership. This study observes 
that 21% of the managers own more than 50% shareholding 
in the companies. This study predicts that for the range of 
26% to 50% and more than 50% shareholding, the majority 
of the managers are family directors and they are also the 
controlling shareholders of the companies. 
 The family ownership results show that 55% or 507 
family directors holds shares within 26% to 50%, followed 
by 33% of family directors own more than 50% of company 
shares and only 9% of family directors hold 5% to 25% 
shareholdings. These findings indicate that the majority 
(97%) of family directors own 5% of shares shareholding 
in the family businesses, and some are the controlling 
directors. Thus, it is evident that ownership structures in 
Malaysia are concentrated and mostly controlled by family 
businesses (Soederberg 2003; Ishak 2004; Abdul Rahman 
2006; Ibrahim & Mohd Samad 2010).
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Multivariate regression analysis is adopted to examine 
the panel data for period of 2003 to 2007. The panel data 
analysis allows for both cross sectional and time series 
effect in the sample and helps in identifying the sources 
of possibly mingled effects (Baltagi 2001; Greene 2000). 
 The diagnostics analyses were done to check for 
the present of multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and 
Hausman tests. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for 
the models range from 1.04 to 3.74, which is below the 
threshold of 10 and multicollinearity is not likely to 
affect the regression analysis (Gujarati 2003: 362; Hair 
et al. 2006: 193; Ho 2006: 258). Based on the Hausman 
tests a significant p-value, prob>chi2 larger than .05 was 
found, so the fixed effect model (FEM) is used for the 
panel data analysis. In addition, based on the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, the p-value is significant and a 
heteroscedasticity problem exists. Therefore, as a remedy, 
this study used the White Heteroscedasticity Consistent 
Variance and Standard error technique as suggested by 
Gujarati (2003) to overcome the problem. Table 5 below 
exhibits the final results.
 Results for both variables in Table 5 show that 
managerial ownership and family ownership are similar 
in terms of coefficient signs. However, MOWN and 
MOWN2 were not statistically significant (for Tobin’s Q). 
The results show different directions: negative, positive 
and negative indicating entrenchment, alignment, and 
entrenchment respectively. The different directions may 
arise because most companies in Malaysia put their family 
members in the board as outside directors. The family 
directors can make sub-optimal investment decisions 
since the interests of the family are not necessarily in 
line with other shareholders (Fama & Jensen 1985). They 
may also use the concentrated ownership to expropriate 
wealth from other shareholders (Morck et al. 2000). 
 Following the procedures by Ng (2005), ownership 
has been identified (negative, positive and negative) 
with company performance (for ROA and ROE). For 
managerial ownership, it indicated that from 0% to 
27%, the managers have greater incentive to pursue 
personal benefits and have less incentive to maximize 
firm value. This is consistent with study done by 
Mat Nor & Sulong (2007) which explained by the 
management entrenchment theory. Another range of 
relationship between performance and managerial 
ownership is between range 27% to 67%. In this range, 
the relationship was positive and the interest of managers 
and shareholders seem to be aligned (alignment theory). 
As managerial ownership continues to rise beyond 67%, 
the management entrenchment starts to dominate again 
at the expense of shareholders’ interests. In another word, 
TABLE 3. Min, Max, Mean and Standard Deviation by Managerial and Family Shareholdings
Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
MOWN 0 74.78 44.63 14.56
FOWN 0 79.54 43.24 14.64
TABLE 4. Frequency and Per Cent by Managerial and Family Shareholdings
Range Managerial Family 
N % N %
Less than 5% 603 29.1 23 2.5
5% to 25% 306 14.8 82 9.0
26% to 50% 730 35.2 507 55.4
More than 50% 435 20.9 303 33.1
Total 2074 100.0 915 100.0
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beyond 67% managerial ownership, the firm value begins 
to fall. This show an alignment/convergence of interest 
hypothesis exists as suggested by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Ali Ahmed (2009) and Mahmud et al. (2010). 
An increase in the proportion of firm’s equity owned by 
insiders is expected to increase firm value as the interest 
of internal and external are realigned, thus, resulting in 
less conflict among the shareholders. However, this study 
observed that when managers own beyond 67% of shares 
in the company, firm performance fall again. The reason 
may be that with greater control and large shareholdings, 
managers are more concerned about their own interests 
rather than the interests of the shareholders at large. In 
sum, it can be concluded that managerial ownership in 
Malaysia is found to be influenced by who control and 
manage the companies, instead of the composition of the 
board of directors. 
 Family ownership shows a non-linear relationship 
with firm value (for Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE). Therefore, 
this study supports H2. It is evident that from 0% to 15%, 
the firm value decreases. Family members that hold small 
number of shares felt less belonging with the firm. It may 
leads to low motivation to work by the family managers 
and a weak sense of belonging towards the business 
success. However, as their shares increase 15% to 49%, the 
firm performance is enhanced. At this level, the interests 
of family directors are aligned with the firm performance. 
The family directors are happy with their share ownership 
and this is the best level for family managers to retain their 
shareholdings and to have a positive performance. But, 
as shareholdings go beyond 49%, the firm value starts to 
drop again. This is where the family directors may act in 
their own interests without considering other shareholders. 
Family members might use their concentrated ownership 
to expropriate wealth of other shareholders. In short, the 
relationship between Malaysian family holdings and firm 
performance is not uniform over the entire range of family 
ownership. The entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment 
exists in Malaysian family-controlled companies. These 
findings do support previous works (Yeh et al. 2001; Ng 
2005) done in Asian countries. The findings from this study 
are similar to past studies done in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
In a Taiwan study, the findings reveal that when family 
ownership is weak, the performance of family-control 
is low. A family only needs 15% equity in a listed firm 
to control the firms effectively. Thus, the effective ways 
of mitigating the ownership problem is when the family 
ownership is high but with low family representation on 
the board. In this way, the conflict of interest between the 
majority and minority shareholders can be minimized 
(Yeh et al. 2001). In Hong Kong scenario, the study 
reveals that at a low level of ownership, managers 
entrench their interest with the companies. Next, when 
ownership is 17% to 63%, family managers interests 
are match with companies need, and firm performance 
improves. However, at high levels of ownership, the 
family management feel stronger in the companies as they 
have sufficient control in the companies and that they can 
benefit more by expropriating the minority shareholders 
(Ng 2005). 
TABLE 5. Regression Results for Managerial and Family Ownership with Company Performance
H Expected sign Q ROA ROE
MOWN
MOWN2
MOWN3
FOWN
FOWN2
FOWN3
DEBT
FSIZE
FAGE
CP
IP
TS
PROP
OTHERS
_CONS
R2
Adj. R2
F stats
P value
H1
H2
+
-
+
-
+
-
-
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-.0004
.0000
-3.50e-07*
-.0023**
.0001***
-8.18e-07***
.0293***
-.0138***
-.0001
.0759***
.1027***
.0867***
.0951***
.1162***
.8881***
17.8
16.03
13.12
0.00
-.0019***
.0001***
-5.29e-07***
-.0038***
.0001***
-8.13e-07***
-.0179*
.0128***
-.0003***
.0178***
.0169***
.0075**
.0049
.0219***
-.1599***
12.11
10.15
8.5
0.00
-.0013***
.0000**
-4.18e-07**
-.0048***
.0002***
-1.22e-06***
-.0515
.0209***
-.0007***
-.0232***
-.0076
-.0147*
-.0484***
-.0051
-.2695***
19.23
2.17
3.63
0.00
* significant at 0.1 (2 tailed), ** significant at 0.05 (2 tailed), ***significant at 0.01 (2 tailed).
Q = Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets, MOWN = % of shares by executive 
directors by total shares issued, FOWN = % of shares by family directors by total shares issued, DEBT = The book value of long-term debt by total assets, 
FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets, FAGE = Number of years since incorporated, CP = Consumer product, IP = Industrial product,  
TS = Trading services, PROP = Property, OTHERS = Plantations, infrastructure projects, technologies, hotels.
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CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDY
Generally, the ownership influences the company 
performance. Family ownership is most prevalent of 
ownership structure. In terms of theoretical perspective, 
the alignment and entrenchment hypothesis were found 
in this Malaysian family ownership. This may be due to 
the concentrated ownership among Malaysian companies 
and that majority of businesses in Malaysia are family-
companies. Regulators and investors’ need to be sensitive 
that the ownership structure in Malaysia is unique because 
Malaysian companies tend to be less dispersed and 
more concentrated. This concentration of ownership is 
found to be owned or held by the State, families or large 
corporations unlike in the West. 
 On the practical side, regulatory bodies such as 
Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia and Committee 
of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance need to take 
note on the percentage of concentrated ownership among 
the family companies. This is because if the percentage 
is too high, so it can threaten the minority shareholders 
and the purchase of shares is no more attractive to the 
investors. Notwithstanding the limitations of this study 
future research may consider looking at qualitative data to 
support the findings. This study is applicable to Malaysia 
at this period of time only. The range of managerial and 
family ownership may behave differently in years to come. 
Although data collected from this study were gathered 
from annual reports, some of the data were dropped due 
to insufficient information. Data on unit trusts, finance and 
banking industries were dropped from the sample due to 
different regulations that govern these industries. 
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